Bangladesh is reassessing its relationship with India under a new government that has placed the “Bangladesh First” policy at the centre of its foreign affairs strategy. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman and Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman have stressed that Dhaka intends to protect national interests while maintaining constructive relations with neighbouring countries. The approach does not amount to a rejection of India, but signals a desire for a more balanced relationship based on sovereign equality, mutual respect and reciprocal benefit.
The shift comes after a period of considerable strain in India-Bangladesh relations following the political upheaval that ended Sheikh Hasina’s long tenure as prime minister. With Dhaka now seeking closer engagement with multiple international partners, including China, the United States and Russia, India faces the challenge of rebuilding confidence while protecting its own strategic interests.
Why Is Bangladesh Rethinking Its Relationship With India?
The reassessment reflects Bangladesh’s broader attempt to place national interests at the centre of its foreign policy. Tarique Rahman, after the BNP’s victory in the February 2026 parliamentary election, said Bangladesh’s interests and those of its people would determine foreign-policy decisions. His government has subsequently presented “Bangladesh First” as a guiding principle rather than a policy directed against any particular country.
Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman later reinforced that position, saying Bangladesh wanted good relations with all countries, particularly its neighbours, on the basis of respect and mutual benefit. The formulation is significant because it indicates that Dhaka is seeking strategic flexibility rather than replacing dependence on one partner with dependence on another.
For India, however, the policy represents a change in tone. New Delhi had developed particularly close ties with the previous Awami League administration, and perceptions that India had been too closely aligned with Sheikh Hasina became an important source of criticism following her removal from power.
What Has Changed Since Bangladesh’s Political Transition?
The political transition has substantially altered the diplomatic environment. During the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh expanded its engagement with countries including China, Pakistan and Turkey, while emphasising sovereignty and national dignity in foreign policy. Analysts subsequently anticipated that a BNP government would pursue a more pragmatic and multipolar approach involving India, China and the United States.
The return of the BNP to power created an opportunity for both Dhaka and New Delhi to reconsider their relationship. Bangladesh’s new leadership has made clear that cooperation with India remains important, but that bilateral ties must be conducted on terms consistent with Bangladesh’s national priorities.
That distinction is particularly relevant because the two countries share a long border, extensive economic links and important interests in transport, energy, water management and regional security.
How Has India Responded to the Bangladesh First Approach?
India has signalled a willingness to engage with the new Bangladeshi government. Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman travelled to New Delhi in April for meetings with Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. During those discussions, Bangladesh reiterated its request for the extradition of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, while India expressed a desire to engage constructively with the new government and strengthen bilateral relations.
The April visit was viewed by regional analysts as an important first step towards resetting relations after a difficult period. The NUS Institute of South Asian Studies said the visit created an opportunity for renewed engagement, although the long-term outcome would depend on both governments’ ability to manage unresolved bilateral problems.
The emphasis on dialogue has continued. In July, India’s High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Dinesh Trivedi, said issues such as the Teesta and Ganges water-sharing disputes could be addressed through mutual understanding and dialogue.
Which Issues Could Define the Future of India-Bangladesh Relations?
Water-sharing is likely to remain one of the most sensitive areas. The long-running dispute over the Teesta River has repeatedly complicated relations, while the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is another major issue requiring sustained diplomatic attention.
Border management is also important. Bangladesh has previously raised concerns about killings and other incidents along the frontier, while India has focused on illegal migration, smuggling and security. Resolving these disputes will require practical cooperation rather than political rhetoric.
Trade and connectivity offer a potentially more positive avenue. Both countries have strong incentives to improve the movement of goods, investment and people across the border. Analysts have identified trade facilitation, visa arrangements, water-sharing and economic cooperation as areas where renewed engagement could produce tangible results.
Could Bangladesh First Strengthen Economic Cooperation With India?
The policy could, despite its emphasis on national interests, create opportunities for deeper economic ties. An India-Bangladesh relationship based on reciprocal commercial benefits could be more politically sustainable than one perceived as being driven primarily by strategic considerations.
The Confederation of Indian Industry has said it sees significant alignment between Bangladesh’s “Bangladesh First” strategy and India’s development experience. Indian industry representatives have argued that the current period could help shape a new phase of economic partnership focused on Bangladesh’s long-term growth and competitiveness.
For businesses, the practical priorities are likely to include smoother customs procedures, reliable transport links, investment opportunities, energy cooperation and predictable cross-border regulations.
What Role Will China and Other Powers Play?
Bangladesh’s policy is also taking shape within a wider competition for influence in South Asia. Dhaka has been seeking engagement with China, the United States and Russia alongside its relationship with India. In July, Khalilur Rahman held bilateral meetings with the foreign ministers of China and Russia and the US secretary of state on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila. Discussions covered trade, investment, energy and connectivity.
This broader diplomacy suggests that “Bangladesh First” is intended to give Dhaka greater room to manoeuvre. Bangladesh can seek economic and strategic opportunities from several partners while avoiding an exclusive alignment with any single major power.
For India, that means maintaining a constructive relationship will increasingly depend on demonstrating practical benefits rather than relying solely on geographic proximity or historic ties.
What Could Happen Next Between Bangladesh and India?
The next phase is likely to focus on converting diplomatic signals into concrete agreements. Water-sharing negotiations, border security, trade, visas, connectivity and the future of cross-border economic projects will provide important tests of whether the relationship can move beyond recent tensions.
A further sign of the relationship’s importance is the expected first official visit to India by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman. Indian media reported on 16 August that discussions were under way for a visit in the 20–25 August window, although exact dates were still being finalised.
Such a visit could provide an opportunity for both governments to establish a new political framework for bilateral relations. It could also demonstrate whether Bangladesh First is primarily a negotiating position or the foundation of a long-term foreign-policy doctrine.
Why Does the Bangladesh First Policy Matter Beyond India?
The significance of the policy extends beyond bilateral diplomacy. Bangladesh occupies a strategically important position between South and Southeast Asia, with access to the Bay of Bengal and growing economic links with major regional and global powers.
A more balanced foreign policy could allow Dhaka to attract investment, expand trade relationships and strengthen its negotiating position with larger neighbours. At the same time, India has strong interests in maintaining stability along its eastern frontier and ensuring reliable regional connectivity.
The challenge for both sides will be to manage differences without allowing individual disputes to undermine wider cooperation.
Conclusion: Bangladesh’s “Bangladesh First” policy marks a clear attempt to redefine the country’s external relations around national interests, strategic autonomy and reciprocal benefit. It should not be interpreted simply as an anti-India shift. Instead, the emerging approach points towards a more transactional and balanced relationship in which cooperation will be judged by practical outcomes. The coming months, particularly any high-level engagement between Tarique Rahman’s government and New Delhi, will show whether the two countries can turn the current diplomatic reset into lasting progress on trade, water, security and connectivity. For Bangladesh and India alike, the direction of the relationship will remain an important indicator of the wider political and economic balance in South Asia.
